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INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects individuals from employ-
ment discrimination, whether it is based on sex, religion, national origin,
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race, or color.1  That is the part everyone knows.  What most do not know is
that the route to remedy depends on where you work.  Private sector employ-
ees at qualifying employers2 have a simple route: file a charge at the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) or its state-level equivalent,
and either seek redress in the administrative realm, or get a “right-to-sue”
letter and take the case to a federal district court.3  This gives litigants auton-
omy to choose which path they prefer, depending on their goals.  However,
for some, the path has already been decided.  These employees cannot file
their suits in federal district courts.4  They cannot argue their cases to juries.5
They cannot even argue before Article III judges.6  Instead, they must rely on
an administrative framework, in front of administrative judges, with altered
rules of evidence,7 all because they fell through the “trapdoor” of Title VII:
the “employee” exemptions in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).
Normally, “employees” are allowed to file their cases with the EEOC and
choose whether to follow the administrative resolution process or take their
cases to court.8  But the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 created
three exemptions to Title VII’s definition of “employee,” applicable only to
state government employees.9  If individuals fit into one of these exemptions,
they fall out of Title VII’s protections.10  Instead, they must rely on section
321 of the Government Employee Rights Act of 1991 (GERA), which estab-
lishes a mandatory administrative procedure for the aggrieved employees.11
This is what makes Title VII’s “employee” exemptions act as a “trapdoor”; the
exemptions drop certain state-employed persons from Title VII’s coverage,
only for them to be caught in the “safety net” of GERA.
This is problematic for several reasons.  First, GERA is far from a perfect
safety net.  GERA offers lesser protections from discrimination, both legally
and practically speaking, and lesser remedies.12  This problem is com-
pounded by the fact that courts and EEOC investigators are not sure who is
subject to the trapdoor and who is not.  The trapdoor’s rules seem clear—for
example, the trapdoor applies to persons chosen to be the personal staff of an
1 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (prohibited actions).
2 See id. § 2000e(b) (setting definitions for “employer” under Title VII).
3 45C AM. JUR. 2D Job Discrimination § 1965 (2018); Filing a Lawsuit, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/lawsuit.cfm (last visited Aug.
24, 2019).
4 Brazoria County v. EEOC, 391 F.3d 685, 696 n.1 (5th Cir. 2004) (Pickering, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
5 See id.
6 See id.
7 See id.; 29 C.F.R. § 1603.214 (2018).
8 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
9 42 U.S.C. 2000e(f) (2012).
10 Id.
11 Government Employee Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–166, § 321, 105 Stat.
1088, 1098 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16c).
12 See infra Part I.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-1\NDL111.txt unknown Seq: 3 26-NOV-19 8:44
2019] narrowing  the  gera  trapdoor 415
elected state official.13  But what does “personal staff” mean?  The circuit
courts have splintered on who counts as “personal staff” and they disagree on
what test should be used to determine if a charging party is “personal staff.”
This has led the EEOC to misclassify some plaintiffs, leading to fruitless dis-
trict court lawsuits that end up being sent back to the EEOC.14
This murkiness is especially problematic given the recent revelations of
discrimination in politics.  As the #MeToo movement marches on, sexual
harassment claims under Title VII are increasing15 and many state political
workers are reflecting on the appropriateness of their workplace cultures.16
For instance, survey data in the Connecticut state legislature reported that
many viewed “‘sexual harassment [as] a pervasive problem’ within the Gen-
eral Assembly.”17  In Washington, a letter decrying the tolerance for groping
and sexual innuendo within the state legislature gathered more than two
hundred signatures, with lobbyists and lawmakers being among the signato-
ries.18  Even Americans outside of state politics are weighing in on the issue;
a jury in Iowa awarded a former Iowa Senate staffer over two million dollars
for the sexual harassment she suffered in the state capitol.19  This is not
solely a state politics problem either: the #MeToo movement has also
revealed accusations within the U.S. Congress.20  For instance, allegations
13 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (exempting persons “chosen by [a state elected offi-
cial] to be on such officer’s personal staff” from Title VII), with id. § 2000e-16c(a)(1) (stat-
ing that the catchall of GERA encompasses any “member of [an] elected official’s personal
staff.”).
14 See Edelstein v. Stephens, No. 1:17-cv-305, 2018 WL 948769, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Feb.
16, 2018) (dismissing a Title VII claim since the plaintiff was “personal staff”), adopted in
part and rejected in part by No. 1:17-cv-305, 2018 WL 1558868, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 31,
2018).
15 Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Releases Preliminary
FY 2018 Sexual Harassment Data (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/
release/10-4-18.cfm.
16 See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 355 (7th Cir. 2017) (Posner, J.,
concurring) (“[I]t has taken our courts and our society a considerable while to realize that
sexual harassment, which has been pervasive in many workplaces (including many Capitol
Hill offices . . .), is a form of sex discrimination.”).
17 Mike Savino, Connecticut State Legislature Updates Sexual Harassment Policy After Survey
Results, REC.-J. (Sept. 22, 2018), http://www.myrecordjournal.com/News/State/Legisla
ture-updates-sexual-harassment-policy-after-survey-results.html.
18 Rachel La Corte, Washington Lawmakers Working on Sexual Misconduct Policies, AP
NEWS (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/a2e70056aba24eaf8cfbde489f6c8fde.
19 Brianne Pfannenstiel, Kirsten Anderson Offered State $1.25M Settlement in Harassment
Case That Earned Her $2.2M Verdict, DES MOINES REG. (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www
.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/politics/2017/08/10/kirsten-anderson-offered-state-
1-25-m-settlement-harassment-case-earned-her-2-2-m-verdict/557623001/.
20 See generally Christina C. Hopke, Note, Is Congress Holding Itself to Account? Addressing
Congress’s Sexual Harassment Problem and the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 Reform Act,
94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2159 (2019); Heidi M. Przybyla, House Democrat Divisions Erupt as
Sexual Harassment Issue Heats Up, Threatens Members, USA TODAY (Nov. 29, 2017), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/11/29/house-democrats-divided-sexual-har
assment-issue-heats-up-threatens-members/906825001/.
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against some U.S. representatives received considerable press after it was
reported that the congressmen used taxpayer funds to settle complaints
against them.21  While additional protections have been enacted for congres-
sional employees,22 protections for state government employees have not
received similar attention.23  This Note focuses on the federal remedies avail-
able to one class of these employees: the “personal staff” of state-level elected
officials.  They must be given a fair opportunity to say “me too.”
Given this context, we should revisit what protections are available to
these state workers and push for reforms that further sexual equality.  One
way to do so is to decrease the size of Title VII’s trapdoor.  This Note aims to
fight sexual harassment in politics by advocating for a narrower understand-
ing of the trapdoor, such that more plaintiffs are eligible to bring Title VII
actions rather than GERA actions.  Specifically, this Note explains why the
“personal staff” trapdoor should be narrowed and then provides a method
for how to do so—by settling a circuit split on the interpretation of “personal
staff.”
Part I explains the relationship between Title VII and GERA.  It illus-
trates the machinery behind the trapdoor and details how the “personal
staff” exemption can take a charging party out of Title VII and plug them
into GERA.  Part II then presents policy reasons for narrowing the “personal
staff” exemption.  While GERA does offer some protection, the protections
of Title VII are more desirable.  Given the context of state politics, Title VII
offers a better forum (federal court and juries), better remedies (punitive
damages), and better oversight by the EEOC (through Commissioner
charges).24  Furthermore, extending Title VII protection to state government
workers will give them equivalent protection to congressional workers.25
Whereas Part II explains “why,” Parts III and IV describe “how.”  Part III
details the circuit split over the “personal staff” exemption.  In deciding
between two multifactor balancing tests, one by the Fourth Circuit and one
by the Fifth Circuit, Section IV.A argues that the Fourth Circuit’s test will
better narrow the trapdoor and offer more litigants Title VII protection.  Sec-
tion IV.B then provides a legal basis for choosing the Fourth Circuit’s test.
21 See Press Release, Comm. on Ethics, U.S. House of Representatives, Statement of the
Chairwoman and Ranking Member of the Committee on Ethics Regarding Representative
Patrick Meehan (Jan. 22, 2018), https://ethics.house.gov/sites/ethics.house.gov/files/
20180118%20Public%20Statement.pdf; Katie Rogers & Kenneth P. Vogel, Congressman
Combating Harassment Settled His Own Misconduct Case, N.Y. TIMES (Jan 20, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/01/20/us/politics/patrick-meehan-sexual-harassment.html.
22 See Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 115-397, 132
Stat. 5297 (2018) (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.); Hopke, supra note 20, at
2182–85 (containing a general discussion of these reforms).
23 See 2 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(3) (2012) (providing that “covered employee[s]” under the
Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 did not include state government employees);
Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 Reform Act, 132 Stat. 5297 (reforming protec-
tions to federal government employees, without discussing state government employees).
24 See infra Sections II.A–B.
25 See infra Section II.C.
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Because the Fourth Circuit test better aligns with congressional intent, Title
VII’s legislative purpose, and agency interpretations of the statue, it repre-
sents the proper interpretation of the “personal staff” exemption and should
be favored.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE TITLE VII–GERA RELATIONSHIP
First, we must examine why Title VII’s definition of “employee” is a trap-
door hidden in plain sight.  Title VII protects “employees” from disparate
treatment and harassment,26 and the word “employee” is a defined term in
the statute.27  While the statutory definition of “employee” under 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(f)28 is broad, encompassing a large percentage of America’s
workforce, the definition specifically exempts three types of workers from
Title VII’s protections.  Under these exemptions,
the term ‘employee’ shall not include any person elected to public office in
any State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof,
or any person chosen by such officer to be on such officer’s personal staff, or
an appointee on the policy making level or an immediate adviser with
respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office.29
26 Technically, Title VII protects “individuals” from disparate treatment and harass-
ment. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63
(1986) (recognizing that sexual harassment can be discrimination “because of” sex);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973) (creating a burden-shifting
framework for proving disparate treatment claims of discrimination).  Section 2000e-
2(a)(1) says that it is unlawful “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis
added).  Note that the sentence does not include the word “employee.” Id.  Could dispa-
rate treatment or sexual harassment plaintiffs who are “personal staff” and thus not
“employees” argue that they should be able to pursue Title VII relief anyway because
§ 2000e-2(a)(1) applies to “individuals,” and not “employees”?  In short, no.  Many circuit
courts have chosen to read in the word “employee,” and thereby exempt anyone who falls
through the trapdoor. See Birch v. Cuyahoga Cty. Prob. Court, 392 F.3d 151, 157 (6th Cir.
2004) (stating that “courts have limited Title VII’s protections to individuals who are
‘employees,’” notwithstanding the word “individuals” (citing Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits,
Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1242 (11th Cir. 1998))).  Thus, for all intents and purposes,
whether someone is an “employee” under § 2000e(f) determines whether he or she is
within Title VII’s reach, or within GERA’s.  This also corroborates the drafting history of
the provision.  The “employee” exemptions were added to offset the expansion of the defi-
nition of “person,” which was amended to include state governments. See Fischer v. N.Y.
State Dep’t. of Law, 812 F.3d 268, 278 (2d Cir. 2016); Alaska v. EEOC, 564 F.3d 1062, 1087
(9th Cir. 2009) (Ikuta, J., dissenting).  Thus, the natural interpretation of the “employee”
definition is that it serves as a threshold for who the cognizable charging parties and plain-
tiffs are, even if the term is not used in § 2000e-2(a).
27 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f); see Kelley v. City of Albuquerque, 542 F.3d 802, 807–08 (10th
Cir. 2008).
28 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).
29 Id.  While the other two exemptions—“appointee[s]” and “immediate adviser[s]”—
also act as trapdoors, this Note is focused solely on the first exemption: “personal staff.”
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These provisions act as an off-ramp, allowing courts to grant Rule 12(b)
motions and summary judgment motions against plaintiffs who seek the pro-
tection of Title VII.30  Similar exemptions can also be found in the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act (ADEA)31 and the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA),32 whose definitions are also exported to the Family and Medical
Leave Act (FMLA)33 and the Equal Pay Act.34
These exemptions were added to Title VII as part of the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Act of 1972.35  But until 1991, there was no backstop for
those who were exempted.36  Instead, they had to rely upon other causes of
action not based in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, such as § 1983, § 1981, state
discrimination laws, and state tort law claims.37  However, in the Civil Rights
30 See, e.g., Birch, 392 F.3d at 155, 159 (affirming a grant of summary judgment on Title
VII claim because of the “employee” exemption); Bland v. New York, 263 F. Supp. 2d 526,
531, 545 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (dismissing plaintiff’s Title VII claim on a Rule 12(b) motion
because of the “employee” exemption).
31 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (“The term ‘employee’ . . . shall not include . . . any person
chosen by such officer to be on such officer’s personal staff . . . .”) (emphasis added).  The
language of the Government Employee Rights Act of 1991 (GERA) also extends the pro-
tections of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to “personal staff,” despite no men-
tion of the phrase “personal staff” in the ADA.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16c.
32 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(2)(C)(ii)(II).
33 See Rutland v. Pepper, 404 F.3d 921, 924 n.2 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Nichols v. Hur-
ley, 921 F.2d 1101, 1103 (10th Cir. 1990) (per curiam)).
34 See Reardon v. Herring, 191 F. Supp. 3d 529, 536 (E.D. Va. 2016).
35 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103,
103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e).
36 See Nichols, 921 F.2d at 1103, 1111 (affirming summary judgment on the “personal
staff” finding and ending the inquiry).
37 These avenues still exist today, but they are questionable alternatives.  Litigants
could turn to § 1983, which protects citizens from “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added).  But
§ 1983 is riddled with obstacles.  If a litigant argues § 1983 based on the “and laws” portion,
there is debate over whether GERA provides an exclusive remedy and thus precludes
§ 1983 suits. See Dyer v. Radcliffe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 770, 777 (S.D. Ohio 2001).  If litigants
instead argue on a constitutional basis (or if their statutory claims somehow survive the
preclusion arguments), they must still topple qualified immunity, a “shield against govern-
ment damages liability [that] is stronger than ever.”  Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against
Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1797, 1798 (2018).  Litigants could avoid quali-
fied immunity by suing officials in their official capacities, but then the plaintiffs cannot
recover damages. See Evelyn Corwin McCafferty, Comment, Age Discrimination and Sovereign
Immunity: Does Kimel Signal the End of the Line for Alabama’s State Employees?, 52 ALA. L. REV.
1057, 1058 (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663–68 (1974)).  Then there is § 1981,
which ensures citizens “shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and
enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.”  42 U.S.C. § 1981(a).  But this statute
only prohibits racial discrimination. See Bobo v. ITT, Cont’l Baking Co., 662 F.2d 340,
342–44 (5th Cir. 1981) (“[N]o court has held that allegations of gender based discrimina-
tion fall within [§ 1981’s] purview.”).  It is cold comfort for the victims of sexual harass-
ment.  Finally, there are state discrimination statutes and state tort laws, but these claims
are unlikely to make it to federal court without supplemental jurisdiction on another
claim, unless there is diversity of citizenship. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1367.  Federal court is
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Act of 1991, Congress created a catchall civil rights statute to cover any plain-
tiffs who fell through the trapdoor.  This was embodied in GERA, which cre-
ated an administrative remedy for
any individual chosen or appointed, by a person elected to public office in
any State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters
thereof—
(1) to be a member of the elected official’s personal staff;
(2) to serve the elected official on the policymaking level; or
(3) to serve the elected official as an immediate advisor with respect to
the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office.38
Note how this provision mirrors the exemptions in Title VII.39  Because
of the identical provisions, circuit courts have concluded that the analysis
under Title VII—regarding whether a worker is a protected “employee”—is
the same analysis for deciding whether a worker qualifies for the catchall
provision of GERA.40  In other words, if a court held that a worker was “per-
sonal staff” of a state elected official, and not covered by Title VII, the court
would by extension rule that the worker qualifies for the catchall of GERA.
This two-step tango is how the “employee” exemptions act as a trapdoor: step
one, a charging party falls out of Title VII, and, step two, they fall into the
arms of GERA.
Determining whether an employee is “personal staff” is difficult, and
courts are undecided on what test should be used to make this determina-
tion.41  Two circuits have created tests—the Fourth Circuit and the Fifth Cir-
cuit42—to determine who is “personal staff.”  But for policy reasons,
whichever test produces the narrower understanding of “personal staff”
should be used.  The following Part explains why.
also preferable to state court for GERA claims.  State court, while providing a jury trial and
the publicity of a public forum, does not benefit from the political independence of an
Article III judge.  GERA claims all arise from state politics, and given that a vast majority of
state trial judges are elected to the bench, the fear of political interference and pretextual
dismissal lingers. See JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE’S COURTS 3–4 (2012) (dis-
cussing state judicial elections and the power of donations).  In cases regarding sexual
harassment in state governments, the integrity of the trier of fact is essential to reaching a
just result.
38 Government Employee Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16c(a).
39 Compare id. § 2000e(f) (the employee exemption), with id. § 2000e-16c(a) (GERA).
40 See, e.g., Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. U.S. EEOC, 405 F.3d 840, 843–46 (10th Cir. 2005);
Brazoria County v. EEOC, 391 F.3d 685, 689–90 (5th Cir. 2004).
41 See Lockwood v. McMillan, 237 F. Supp. 3d 840, 857 (S.D. Ind. 2017) (“[T]he Sev-
enth Circuit has not determined the meaning of [personal staff].”); Croci v. Town of
Haverstraw, 175 F. Supp. 3d 373, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“The Second Circuit has not
addressed the ‘personal staff’ exemption contained in § 2000e(f) . . . .”); Gupta v. First
Judicial Dist., 759 F. Supp. 2d 564, 569 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (“The Third Circuit has not set
forth standards for evaluating whether an employee falls within the personal staff
exemption.”).
42 See infra Part III.
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II. POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR NARROWING THE TRAPDOOR
To understand why courts should narrow the trapdoor, it is necessary to
understand the shortcomings of GERA’s catchall provision.  There are three
reasons to favor Title VII protections over GERA protections.  First, by nar-
rowing the trapdoor and keeping litigants in Title VII, plaintiffs will be given
a better forum: federal district court.  In addition, the remedies offered by
Title VII provide better incentives to litigate and a stronger deterrent effect
to respondent employers.  Second, Title VII plaintiffs can have an EEOC
charge filed on their behalf by the EEOC Commissioners themselves (known
as a “Commissioner charge”).43  But this option is likely not available under
GERA.  This is a significant detriment.  A Commissioner charge would be
advantageous given the highly political and close-knit environment “personal
staff” serve in.  Finally, providing Title VII protections rather than GERA pro-
tections would produce consistency among discrimination statutes.  Despite
sexual harassment’s presence in both state and federal government, Congress
has only addressed part of the problem.  In 1995, and again in 2018, Con-
gress passed new protections for congressional employees, while leaving state-
level employees behind.  By narrowing the trapdoor of the “personal staff”
exemption, more people can be afforded Title VII’s advantages.
A. Better Forum and Remedies
First off, Title VII provides a better forum and better remedies for liti-
gants.  As for forums, an individual who qualifies for Title VII is able to file a
Title VII action in federal district court after receiving a Notice of Right to
Sue (or “right-to-sue” letter) from the EEOC.44  The EEOC may issue a right-
to-sue letter either at the close of an EEOC investigation, regardless of the
investigation’s final conclusion, or upon request at any point of the investiga-
tion.45  Therefore, even if the EEOC does not find reasonable cause to
believe a violation has occurred, a charging party can still access federal dis-
trict court through a private civil action.46  This path is closed off to “per-
sonal staff.”  “[P]ersonal staff” plaintiffs under GERA must instead utilize an
administrative framework under the Administrative Procedure Act and can-
not go to district court.47  Instead of an Article III judge, EEOC regulations
dictate that an administrative law judge (ALJ) will conduct a GERA hear-
43 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (authorizing Commissioners to file charges); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1601.11(a) (2018).
44 See 45C AM. JUR. 2D Job Discrimination § 1965 (2018); Filing a Lawsuit, supra note 3.
45 See Filing a Lawsuit, supra note 3; What You Can Expect After You File a Charge, U.S.
EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/process.cfm
(last visited Aug. 24, 2019).
46 See, e.g., Bush v. Mapes Canopies, LLC, No. 4:17CV3135, 2018 WL 2049825, at *2
(D. Neb. Apr. 26, 2018).
47 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16c(b) (“Enforcement by administrative action”).  It is an
open question whether “personal staff” workers can force their way into district court using
§ 1983 and § 1981 claims. Compare Dyer v. Radcliffe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 770, 777 (S.D. Ohio
2001) (finding that GERA’s mandatory administrative remedy precludes § 1983 claims),
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ing.48  These ALJs are empowered to take any appropriate actions their Arti-
cle III counterparts could under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with a
few exceptions.49
While ALJs are afforded a good deal of independence,50 they, and the
administrative framework they operate in, lack several tactical advantages
compared to their brother and sister judges in the federal judiciary.  These
range from the small and minute, such as the lesser number of interrogato-
ries available to litigants,51 to the more substantive, like the instruction that
“the rules on hearsay will not be strictly applied.”52  This is troublesome, as
the rules on hearsay were created to safeguard the trier of fact against poten-
tially untrustworthy information and ensure procedural justice by prohibiting
“evidence information from accusers whom the defendant cannot or could
not confront.”53
The most striking difference between the forums is the trier of fact:
there is neither a public bench trial nor a “jury trial under GERA.”54  GERA
actions will never reach federal trial courts, since the ALJ’s decision is instead
appealed first to the Commission, and then subsequently to a circuit court of
appeals.55  Furthermore, there is likely less publicity in general for GERA
procedures.  While the EEOC has not issued guidelines on the publicity of
GERA hearings, they have ruled that attendance is limited in other adminis-
trative hearings.56  This is a loss not only for the plaintiff, but for society.
Public jury trials—and public bench trials for that matter—provide societal
benefits that the EEOC’s administrative hearings cannot provide.
The first social benefit is public awareness of the claims.  This helps the
protected classes as a whole for both legal and societal reasons.  For instance,
one legal benefit arising from the publicity of discrimination claims is that it
encourages other accusers to come forward.  This benefit is most well noted
in the realm of sexual harassment, which is actionable under both Title VII
and GERA.57  The national publicity given to the allegations and legal pro-
with Levin v. Madigan, 41 F. Supp. 3d 701, 703–07 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (finding that GERA and
the ADEA do not preclude § 1983).
48 See 29 C.F.R. § 1603.202.
49 See id. (“In addition, the administrative law judge shall have the power to . . . [t]ake
any appropriate action authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . .”).
50 See Kent Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1643, 1654–55
(2016).
51 Compare 29 C.F.R. § 1603.210 (allowing twenty interrogatories), with FED. R. CIV. P.
33(a)(1) (allowing twenty-five interrogatories).
52 29 C.F.R. § 1603.214.
53 Justin Sevier, Testing Tribe’s Triangle: Juries, Hearsay, and Psychological Distance, 103
GEO. L.J. 879, 883 (2015) (describing both believed bases for the rule).
54 Levin v. Madigan, 41 F. Supp. 3d 701, 706 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
55 29 C.F.R. §§ 1603.304–.306.
56 For instance, federal sector discrimination claims can be heard under an adminis-
trative judge (AJ), where attendance is limited.  29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(e).
57 For examples in Title VII and GERA, respectively, see Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (recognizing sexual harassment as sex discrimination) and
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ceedings against Harvey Weinstein,58 Jeffrey Epstein,59 and Bill Cosby,60 and
the subsequent cascade of allegations that followed these revelations,61 sup-
port the notion that publicity encourages other victims to come forward.62
This extends beyond just the accused harasser or assailant, and may bring
other, unrelated accusations to light: “The women asserting allegations
against Weinstein have spurred others (both men and women) to come for-
ward and take action. . . .  By the end of November, Entertainment Weekly had
tracked nearly 60 public accusations lodged against the entertainment
elite.”63  Thus, by encouraging other plaintiffs to come forward, society can
discover more of these acts and hold those aggressors accountable.
Bringing other claims to light is also a societal benefit, as it encourages
other victims to seek nonlegal help, such as counseling or crisis intervention.
For instance, the national publicity of Dr. Christine Blasey Ford’s allegations
led to spikes in the number of phone calls at sexual assault crisis hotlines.64
This was not an isolated incident; the Rape, Abuse & Incest National Network
(RAINN) reported that since the #MeToo movement began, the number of
survivors reaching out to the National Sexual Assault Hotline has risen to
record levels.65  Even members of Congress have noted this effect when
releasing their own personal stories about sexual harassment.66  For instance,
Brazoria County v. EEOC, 391 F.3d 685, 687 (5th Cir. 2004) (showing an example of a GERA
claim based on sexual harassment).
58 See Elahe Izadi, Harvey Weinstein Indicted on New Sexual Assault Charges, Could Face Life
in Prison, WASH. POST (July 2, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/arts-and-
entertainment/wp/2018/07/02/harvey-weinstein-indicted-on-new-sexual-assault-charges-
could-face-life-in-prison/.
59 EJ Dickson, More Than a Dozen Jeffrey Epstein Accusers Have Come Forward Since His
Indictment, ROLLING STONE (July 12, 2019), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-
news/jeffrey-epstein-arrest-new-accusers-858394/.
60 See Manuel Roig-Franzia, Bill Cosby Sentenced to 3 to 10 Years in State Prison, WASH.
POST (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/bill-cosby-sen
tenced-to-3-to-10-years-in-state-prison/2018/09/25/9aa620aa-c00d-11e8-90c9-23f963eea
204_story.html.
61 See Dickson, supra note 59.
62 Public knowledge of an accusation was one of the reasons an accuser came forward
against Harvey Weinstein, a powerful and influential figure in the victim’s line of work. See
Jason Kravarik, Harvey Weinstein’s Toughest Fight Is Looming, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/
2018/05/02/entertainment/harvey-weinstein-los-angeles-investigation/index.html (last
updated May 3, 2018).
63 Christopher Butler & Kristin Starnes Gray, Despicable #MeToo: Lessons from Weinstein,
Other Sexual Harassment Allegations, 30 GA. EMP. L. LETTER 3 (2017).
64 Willa Frej, Sexual Assault Hotline Calls Spiked During Kavanaugh Hearing, HUFFINGTON
POST (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/sexual-assault-hotline-
spike-kavanaugh-hearings_us_5badec39e4b0425e3c227446.
65 Lisa Lambert, #MeToo Effect: Calls Flood U.S. Sexual Assault Hotlines, REUTERS (Jan. 17,
2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-harassment-helplines/metoo-effect-calls-
flood-u-s-sexual-assault-hotlines-idUSKBN1F6194.
66 Sunlen Serfaty, Congresswoman Describes Sexual Assault in #MeToo Video, CNN, https:/
/www.cnn.com/2017/10/27/politics/jackie-speier-me-too-sexual-assault-harassment/in
dex.html (last updated Oct. 27, 2017).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-1\NDL111.txt unknown Seq: 11 26-NOV-19 8:44
2019] narrowing  the  gera  trapdoor 423
since U.S. Representative Jackie Speier publicly described her experience
with sexual harassment when she was a congressional staffer, “an aide to the
congresswoman says her office has been flooded by telephone calls and email
messages,” many thanking her and some even sharing “their own stories of
alleged harassment within the halls of Congress.”67  Increasing public knowl-
edge of discrimination claims is beneficial even outside the sexual harass-
ment and sexual assault context, as it can encourage individuals who have
been discriminated against to seek support for the trauma stemming from
the discrimination.68
The value of public awareness rings even more true in the context of
state politics.  In the small worlds of Springfield, Illinois; Albany, New York;
and Sacramento, California, the fear of retaliation is high.  In an op-ed to
Teen Vogue written by Illinois State Representative Litesa Wallace, Ms. Wallace
detailed the harassment she and others experienced, both as a staffer and as
an elected official.69  She noted that the “[c]onsequences for sexual harass-
ment are few and far between in Springfield.  But the political consequences
for speaking out are almost guaranteed.”70  However, placing justice in the
hands of Article III courts may negate these concerns.  The publicity sur-
rounding a given case may protect plaintiffs by making the public more
attuned to any attempts at retaliation.  The fear of public backlash from per-
ceived retaliation should chill malicious actions by the elected official.71  In
addition, allowing these accusations to come forward will aid the political
process.  Directly, accusations of discrimination may cast light on whether an
official holds discriminatory views.  Indirectly, an official’s response to these
allegations may shed light on that official’s views regarding the significance
of discrimination and harassment.  In the end, publicity of these claims
informs the electorate of the official’s character.
Finally, public exposure to cases like these prevent “stacking the deck”
against either party.72  For instance, the Wall Street Journal reported in 2015
that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which utilizes five
67 Id.
68 See Discrimination: What It Is, and How to Cope, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, https://www.apa
.org/helpcenter/discrimination.aspx (last visited Aug. 31, 2019) (showing how discrimina-
tion can take a toll on an individual, and advocating these victims seek assistance).
69 Litesa Wallace, Rep. Litesa Wallace Details Sexual Harassment of Black Women in Govern-
ment, TEEN VOGUE (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.teenvogue.com/story/rep-litesa-wallace-
details-sexual-harassment-of-black-women-in-government.
70 Id.
71 See Arizona House Votes to Expel Member over Sexual Harassment Complaints, CBS NEWS
(Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/rep-don-shooter-voted-out-arizona-house-
state-legislature-sexual-harassment-report/ (providing an example of how public awareness
of complaints may lead to political consequences, giving officials a reason to avoid
retaliation).
72 This fear appears in other aspects of administrative law as well, most notably in the
concept of “agency capture.”  See J. Jonas Anderson, Court Capture, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1543,
1552–55 (2018) (describing agency capture theory in general).
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ALJs,73 won ninety percent of its administrative proceedings during a five-
year period but only won sixty-nine percent of its cases in federal court dur-
ing the same time span.74  While there is little data on how administrative
judges (AJs) rule in GERA claims, or in EEOC proceedings generally,75 the
fear of a one-sided proceeding lingers.  This scenario can be adequately pre-
vented by narrowing the trapdoor, thereby pushing more claims into federal
court, where verdicts can be publicly displayed, understood, and dissected.
For these reasons, the public awareness associated with bringing a discrimina-
tion claim to federal district court, rather than an AJ hearing, benefits society
overall.
The second societal advantage with public trials is specific to the use of a
jury.  Jury trials better serve litigants because discrimination is highly contex-
tual and subject to contemporary understandings of what is appropriate,
which juries—as laypersons of the community—are better able to assess.  The
use of multiple jurors provides diversity of opinion in interpreting and weigh-
ing the evidence and allows for a more objective understanding of “severe
and pervasive.”76  It also provides a check on government interpretation of
what is “harassment.”  For example, in the wake of the #MeToo movement,
many have raised questions about our current view on what used to be seen
as vulgar, but not actionable, conduct.77  In this aspect, jury trials offer a
better window into what society deems “discrimination.”78  While this Note
does not advocate for transforming Title VII into a civility code, reexamining
the lines between acceptable and unacceptable conduct is important in a
changing country.  This aids society by keeping the law in tune with contem-
porary values.
GERA not only provides a forum that lacks the societal benefits of public
trials but also offers fewer incentives to bring lawsuits.  GERA claims do not
73 Sarah A. Good & Laura C. Hurtado, Questionable Proceedings, L.A. LAW., Feb. 2017, at
30, 30.
74 Id. at 30, 35 n.1 (citing Jean Eaglesham, SEC Wins with In-House Judges, WALL ST. J.
(May 6, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-wins-with-in-house-judges-1430965803).
75 The EEOC primarily relies on AJs rather than ALJs. See Hearings, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/federal/fed_employees/hearing.cfm
(last visited Aug. 31, 2019) (noting that “Administrative Judge[s],” not ALJs, review cases).
76 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (“For sexual harassment to
be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive . . . .”).
77 See Sonia Miller-Van Oort, #MeToo as a Moment of Opportunity, BENCH & B. MINN.,
Mar. 2018, at 4, 4 (noting that the #MeToo movement has opened up discussion on “the
sorts of conduct (intentional or unintentional) that cannot be tolerated”); Meritor, 477 U.S.
at 67 (observing that “not all workplace conduct that may be described as ‘harassment’”
violates Title VII).
78 See Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, Race Inequity Fifty Years Later: Language Rights Under the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 6 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 167, 169–70 (2014) (noting the changing
nature of racial discrimination); Jason M. Solomon, The Political Puzzle of the Civil Jury, 61
EMORY L.J. 1331, 1369 (2012) (“The benefits of group decision making in the deliberative
context include individuals being able to correct one another’s biases . . . .”).
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allow for punitive damages,79 whereas actions under Title VII do.80  Allowing
for punitive damages would further encourage plaintiffs to come forward
despite fears of retaliation and would offer a bounty for plaintiffs’ attorneys
who may be hesitant to represent a client who suffered discrimination in the
political arena for fear of hurting their own political standing.  Title VII’s
advantages—public awareness, jury trials, and punitive damages—weigh in
favor of narrowing the trapdoor.
B. Commissioner Charges
While persons who are discriminated against have the right to file
charges of discrimination with the EEOC, there often may be reasons why
they are hesitant to come forward.  They may fear retaliation, or they may not
trust their complaints will be taken seriously.81  Unlike victims qualifying for
GERA, victims qualifying for Title VII are given an additional safety net
should they be afraid to come forward: a Commissioner charge.  The EEOC
Commissioners are authorized by Congress to file a charge of discrimination
even when an aggrieved person does not.82  The Commissioners are empow-
ered to file charges themselves when they suspect that the fear of retaliation
is inhibiting individuals from filing their own charges, and when the Commis-
sion suspects a “pattern or practice” of discrimination.83  However, while not
explicitly prohibited, it is unlikely that those falling through the trapdoor will
get this additional layer of protection.  Several sources warn hesitation
against a Commissioner charge for GERA violations.  First, Congress clearly
expressed in the enforcement provisions of Title VII that charges could be
filed “by a member of the Commission,”84 whereas when it drafted GERA,
Congress instead wrote that “[a]ny individual referred to [in GERA] may file
a complaint alleging a violation.”85  Second, the EEOC’s own regulations
seem to hint that the Commissioners cannot file charges under GERA.  In
part 1603, the part of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) that governs
GERA, the EEOC has explicitly written that individuals may file claims under
GERA.86  This contrasts with part 1601, the part governing the procedural
79 Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 307(h), 321(a), 105 Stat. 1088, 1092, 1097–98 (1991) (not-
ing that GERA incorporates the same remedies that are available to hearing boards, which
“have no authority to award punitive damages”); see also Alaska v. EEOC, 508 F.3d 476, 484
(9th Cir. 2007) (Paez, J., dissenting) (“GERA provides for compensatory but not punitive
damages as a remedy for covered ‘State employees’ intentionally discriminated against by
any ‘personnel actions affecting [them].’”) (alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-16b(a)–(b) (2012)).
80 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a).
81 See supra notes 69–75 and accompanying text.
82 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
83 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(e); EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 62 (1984) (citing 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), 2000e-6(e) (1982); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.7, .11 (1983)).
84 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2012).
85 Id. § 2000e-16c(b)(1) (emphasis added).
86 29 C.F.R. § 1603.102(a) (2018) (“(a) Who may make a complaint.  Individuals . . . may
file a complaint . . . .”).
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regulations of Title VII charges, which expressly authorizes the members of
the Commission to file charges.87  Furthermore, Commissioner charges for
GERA claims would present a puzzling scenario.  Consider this hypothetical:
if the Commissioners were to file a GERA charge, they would represent an
individual in front of an ALJ, whose presence was requested by the Office of
Federal Operations “on behalf of the Commission.”88  Thus, the EEOC
would be involved in both representing one litigant and selecting the deci-
sionmaker.  Even more puzzling would be the appeal: if the Commissioners
chose to appeal, they would have to appeal it to themselves, since all appeals
from ALJ GERA hearings are reviewed by the Commission.89  In a hypotheti-
cal Commissioner charge under GERA, the Commissioners would have to
wear two hats, acting as both the litigating party and as the appellate body.
Thus, not only do the EEOC regulations counsel against a Commissioner
charge under GERA, it also would be impractical.
This is to the detriment of state government employees who have fallen
through the trapdoor.  They would directly benefit from the availability of
Commissioner charges, given the considerable fear of retaliation in the realm
of politics.  Washington State Representative Nicole Macri summed up what
leaves staffers nervous about speaking out: “People are not reporting because
they don’t trust reports will be really vetted, that there will be consequences
to harassers and that careers won’t be ruined . . . .”90  Illinois State Represen-
tative Wallace also observed that the fear of political consequences for report-
ing often silences victims of harassment.91  Such fear of retaliation is not
without merit either.  The EEOC reported that the fiscal year of 2017 had the
second highest number of retaliation charges ever filed.92
87 Id. § 1601.11(a) (“Any member of the Commission may file a charge with the
Commission.”).
88 Id. § 1603.201(a).
89 See id. § 1603.304(d).
90 La Corte, supra note 18.
91 Wallace, supra note 69.
92 See infra Figure 1.
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FIGURE 1: RETALIATION CHARGES FILED WITH THE EEOC UNDER ALL
STATUTES BETWEEN FISCAL YEAR 2007 AND FISCAL YEAR 2017
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Note: Based on data compiled by the Office of Research, Information and Planning
and published by the EEOC.93  This data does not include charges reported with state
or local Fair Employment Practices Agencies.94
The Commission also reported that nearly half of the EEOC’s total
84,254 charges in 2017 included a charge of retaliation, and that thirty-eight
percent of the total charges were retaliation charges under Title VII alone.95
Given this data, a member of a public official’s “personal staff” is certainly
reasonable in fearing retaliation, especially in the small world of state polit-
ics.  A telling example of this fear unfolded in the Illinois State Legislature.
In May of 2018, Illinois State Representative Kelly Cassidy alleged that associ-
ates of Illinois House Speaker Michael Madigan targeted her after she called
for inquiries into sexual harassment within the state legislature and the
Speaker’s office.96  While the retaliation here is aimed at the elected official
and not a member of “personal staff,” try and imagine the reaction of Repre-
sentative Cassidy’s “personal staff.”  If the elected official isn’t safe from retali-
ation, then who is?
C. The Desire for Legislative Consistency
Employees of the U.S. Senate, like the “personal staff” of state elected
officials, were also originally exempt from Title VII’s protections.97  That
changed with sections 301–20 of the Government Employee Rights Act of
93 Charge Statistics (Charges Filed with EEOC) FY 1997 Through FY 2017, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges
.cfm (last visited Aug. 31, 2019).
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 See Monique Garcia, Madigan Under Fire Again over Handling of Sexual Harassment
Claims, Asks for Watchdog Investigation, CHI. TRIB. (May 23, 2018), https://www.chicagotrib
une.com/politics/ct-met-michael-madigan-kelly-cassidy-20180522-story.html.
97 Hopke, supra note 20, at 2171 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012)).
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1991.98  Under section 302, “[a]ll personnel actions affecting employees of
the Senate shall be made free from any discrimination” based on “race, color,
religion, sex or national origin,” within the meaning of Title VII’s federal
protections; “age,” as defined in the ADEA; or “handicap or disability,” within
the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities
Act.99
The remedy for these Senate employees was administrative; they could
seek counseling, mediation, and a hearing with the newly created Office of
Senate Fair Employment Practices.100  The U.S. House of Representatives
passed a similar resolution a few years earlier, protecting employees from
discrimination by providing them with an administrative remedy.101  Both
houses’ provisions were similar to GERA’s “personal staff” protections: both
provided for agency review rather than causes of action in federal district
court, and the Senate, like the EEOC, allowed appeal to a federal circuit
court.102
But this framework did not last.  Less than five years later, Congress
repealed the administrative procedures for congressional employees by pass-
ing the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 (CAA).103  This legislation
expanded protections for congressional staffers104 and awarded them the
better forums that GERA-qualifying staffers lacked.105  The CAA gave cov-
ered employees the autonomy to seek justice in an administrative framework
with the Office of Compliance, or to take their cases straight to federal dis-
trict court.106  This gave the “personal staff” of representatives and senators
more autonomy and better protection than their state-employed counter-
parts.  Congress gave congressional aides even more protection in the Con-
gressional Accountability Act of 1995 Reform Act, which eliminated CAA’s
mandatory mediation and counseling requirements.107  Thus, under the cur-
rent law, congressional aides can immediately file their cases in district court
without first seeking relief with the Office of Compliance.
This presents an inconsistency in equal opportunity protection laws.
Members of Congress gave their own “personal staff” these protections but
did not take the opportunity to give the same protections to workers in state
98 See Government Employee Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 301–21, 105
Stat. 1088, 1088–97.
99 Id. at § 302.
100 Id. §§ 303, 305–07.
101 H.R. Res. 558, 100th Cong.,134 CONG. REC. 27,840 (1988) (enacted).
102 See id.; see also Government Employee Rights Act § 309(a).
103 Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-1, § 504(a)(2), 109 Stat.
3, 41 (1995) (repealing GERA sections 303–319).
104 See id. § 101(3) (broadly defining “covered employee”).
105 See id. § 401(3) (giving the litigant a choice between the administrative framework
and a civil action in federal district court); id. § 408 (providing a jury trial right and federal
subject matter jurisdiction).
106 See id. § 401; id. § 101(12) (defining “Office” as the Office of Compliance).
107 Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 115-397,
§ 101(b)(2), 132 Stat. 5297, 5300–01 (2018) (amending § 408(a) of the CAA).
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legislatures, courts, and executive offices.  If not for the practical considera-
tions that aid the elimination of sexual harassment, then the trapdoor should
at least be narrowed to provide consistency between these groups.
III. THE “PERSONAL STAFF” SPLIT
For the above reasons, narrowing the trapdoor is clearly beneficial on
policy grounds.  So how can the trapdoor be narrowed?  The “employee”
exemptions could be narrowed by Congress, but a less burdensome path
exists.  Currently, the circuit courts are split on what test determines if an
individual is “personal staff” under Title VII.108  By selecting the test that
produces a smaller subset of GERA employees, the judiciary can narrow the
trapdoor on its own.  The following section details the two different “per-
sonal staff” tests.
A. The Fourth Circuit’s Guided Approach
The Fourth Circuit was the first circuit to create a test for the personal
staff exemption.109  Over the course of two cases, the court created a mul-
tifactor balancing test, guided by a central principle. The principle was
articulated first.  In Curl v. Reavis,110 Barbara Curl worked as a deputy sheriff
with the Iredell County Sheriff’s Department.111  Despite holding the title of
deputy sheriff, she worked as a secretary for the detective division.112  Ms.
Curl was told that she could not be promoted to the position of road patrol
deputy because, in the words of the Chief Deputy, “there was no way [the
department] would put a woman on the road . . . in uniform.”113  Ms. Curl
subsequently filed suit under Title VII and § 1983.114  After a bench trial, the
district court ruled for Ms. Curl on the merits, prompting an appeal to the
Fourth Circuit.115
On appeal, the defendants argued that Ms. Curl fell through the trap-
door and was not an “employee” under § 2000e(f).116  Instead, they argued
she was “personal staff” of the sheriff.117  In looking to see if Ms. Curl was
exempted as “personal staff” of an elected official, the Fourth Circuit looked
108 See infra Sections III.A–B.
109 Cases preceding Curl had articulated principles that have today largely been sub-
sumed by current Fourth and Fifth Circuit tests. See Curl v. Reavis, 740 F.2d 1323, 1328
(4th Cir. 1984) (noting the principles of Owens v. Rush, 654 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1981),
and Calderon v. Martin County, 639 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. Unit B Mar. 1981), previous “personal
staff” cases); Teneyuca v. Bexar County, 767 F.2d 148, 150–52 (5th Cir. 1985) (same).
110 740 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1984).
111 Id. at 1324–25.
112 Id. at 1325.
113 Id. (omission in original).
114 Id. at 1324.
115 Id. at 1324–25.
116 Id. at 1327 (explaining defendant’s appeal that Curl was not an “employee” under
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2012)).
117 Id. at 1327–28.
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to the Tenth Circuit’s recent holding in Owens v. Rush.118  Under Owens, the
Tenth Circuit viewed the “personal staff exemption” as only covering “those
individuals who are in highly intimate and sensitive positions of responsibility
on the staff of the elected official.”119  Using this principle, the Fourth Cir-
cuit began assessing Ms. Curl’s position, analyzing the “nature and circum-
stances of her role in the Sheriff’s Department.”120
As a starting point, the Fourth Circuit noted that Ms. Curl was not under
the personal direction of the elected official (the sheriff), and her promotion
requests were brought to the sheriff’s subordinate—the chief deputy.121  Ms.
Curl was not high in the chain of command, and her duties as secretary to
the detective division were mostly clerical: she typed documents, handled
phone calls and correspondences for the detectives, and assigned case
files.122  Since she did not work in a highly intimate and sensitive position of
responsibility on the sheriff’s staff, the Fourth Circuit found that Ms. Curl was
not “personal staff” under Title VII.123
While the Tenth Circuit later replaced Owens with a multifactor balanc-
ing test,124 its “highly intimate and sensitive position[ ]” principle lived on in
the Fourth Circuit.125  But the Fourth Circuit also mixed in a list of factors to
supplement the principle.  In Cromer v. Brown, the plaintiff, Patrick Cromer,
was an African American captain for the sheriff of Greenville County, South
Carolina.126  When Cromer was demoted to the position of lieutenant, and
then fired from that position, he filed a Title VII action against the sheriff.127
The district court granted the defendant sheriff’s motion for summary judg-
ment, ruling that Mr. Cromer was serving as “personal staff” for an elected
official.128
On appeal, the Cromer court first began by emphasizing that the word
“personal” narrowed the exemption to “some intimate subset of the elected
official’s staff.”129  The court then imposed a flexible list of factors, guided by
the central principle from Curl: “[T]he examination should focus on
whether the employee worked in an intimate and sensitive position of trust,
118 Id. at 1328 (citing Owens v. Rush, 654 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1981)). Owens is no
longer the guiding test in the Tenth Circuit. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
119 Owens, 654 F.2d at 1375.




124 See Nichols v. Hurley, 921 F.2d 1101, 1110 (10th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
125 See Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1323 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting that the Fourth
Circuit has concluded that the “personal staff exception” applies “only to those individuals
who are in highly intimate and sensitive positions of responsibility on the staff of an elected
official” (quoting Brewster v. Barnes, 788 F.2d at 985, 990 (4th Cir. 1986)).
126 Id. at 1318–19.
127 Id. at 1318.
128 Id. at 1322.
129 Id. at 1323.
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close to the elected official.”130  That list of factors started with four factors
evaluated by the district court: (1) “Is promotion of the employee solely up to
the sheriff”; (2) “[d]oes the employee occupy a position high in the chain of
command”; (3) “[d]oes the employee have a highly intimate working rela-
tionship with the sheriff”; and (4) “[d]oes the employee contribute to the
making of policy decisions in the sheriff’s department?”131
The Fourth Circuit then decided to add in four factors of its own:
(5) whether the position in question was created pursuant to state law and
compensated pursuant to state law or was the position funded from the sher-
iff’s discretionary budget; (6) what the full range of the individual’s duties
were; (7) whether the individual worked on the sheriff’s campaigns; and (8)
whether the employee worked under the direction of the sheriff or someone
else.132
Thus, the Fourth Circuit test was born.  In assessing Mr. Cromer’s posi-
tion of lieutenant, the court noted the lack of a working relationship between
Mr. Cromer and the sheriff: Mr. Cromer reported to his own captain, not the
sheriff; Mr. Cromer rarely saw the sheriff and did not work under the sher-
iff’s personal direction; Mr. Cromer had no hand in creating department
policy; Mr. Cromer did not assist in election efforts; and his position was
created and compensated under state law.133
However, when Mr. Cromer served as a captain, the court held that he
did fit the “personal staff” exemption.134  The captain position was the third
highest in the department, falling below only the major and the sheriff.135
The captains were included in command staff meetings with the sheriff,
where they discussed policy and procedure.136  Captains dealt with citizens’
complaints, requiring Mr. Cromer to represent the sheriff outside the depart-
ment in an authoritative capacity.137  Thus, under this framework, he was
part of the sheriff’s personal staff.138
The Fourth Circuit’s approach—relying on a mixture of factors with
emphasis on the “highly intimate” principle—has not left the Fourth Circuit,
130 Id.  While not word-for-word identical with the principle in Curl, the emphasis on
“intimate” and “sensitive” was sufficiently similar to say Cromer reaffirmed Curl.
131 Id.  The Fourth Circuit has indicated that the first factor also extends to hiring and
firing decisions, making it akin to the first factor in Teneyuca, discussed infra Section III.B.
See Harris v. Anne Arundel County, No. CCB-12-0829, 2014 WL 4924308, at *4 (D. Md.
Oct. 1, 2014), aff’d sub nom. Harris v. Leopold, 600 Fed. App’x 114 (4th Cir. 2015) (per
curiam)
132 Crain v. Butler, 419 F. Supp. 2d 785, 790 (E.D.N.C. 2005) (citing Cromer, 88 F.3d at
1323).
133 Cromer, 88 F.3d at 1323–24.
134 Id. at 1324.
135 Id. at 1319.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 1324.
138 Id.
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and when given the option, many courts have avoided it.139  Instead, courts
opt for the Fifth Circuit’s Teneyuca factors, which are explained next.
B. The Fifth Circuit’s Multifactor Balancing Test
In Teneyuca v. Bexar County,140 the Fifth Circuit, looking to Curl and a
Ninth Circuit case, Ramirez v. San Mateo County District Attorney’s Office,141 cre-
ated a slightly different multifactor test to decide whether an individual is
exempted “personal staff.”  The case involved Sharyl Teneyuca, an attorney
in Bexar County, Texas.142  Ms. Teneyuca applied to be an assistant district
attorney with Bexar County, but was not hired.143  She filed a Title VII sex
discrimination claim, alleging that lesser-qualified male applicants were hired
in her stead.144  The County moved for summary judgment, arguing that the
position of assistant district attorney was the “personal staff” of the district
attorney—an elected official—and thus excluding Ms. Teneyuca from Title
VII protection.145
The Fifth Circuit opted to merge the holdings of Curl and Ramirez with
the Eighth Circuit’s view in Goodwin v. Circuit Court of St. Louis County,146 and
the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Owens v. Rush.147  The result was a list of six
factors:
(1) whether the elected official has plenary powers of appointment and
removal, (2) whether the person in the position at issue is personally
accountable to only that elected official, (3) whether the person in the posi-
tion at issue represents the elected official in the eyes of the public, (4)
whether the elected official exercises a considerable amount of control over
the position, (5) the level of the position within the organization’s chain of
command, and (6) the actual intimacy of the working relationship between
the elected official and the person filling the position.148
The Teneyuca court then provided instruction on the scope of the
exemption.  First, the court said that the “consideration of these factors must
be tempered by the legislative history of this provision which indicates that
139 See, e.g., Bland v. New York, 263 F. Supp. 2d. 526, 542–44 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (relying
on Teneyuca rather than the Fourth Circuit’s approach in Curl and Cromer.)
140 767 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1985).
141 639 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1981).
142 Teneyuca, 767 F.2d at 149.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 149–50.
146 729 F.2d 541 (8th Cir. 1984).  Today, the Eighth Circuit uses Teneyuca for determin-
ing who is “personal staff.”  Hemminghaus v. Missouri, 756 F.3d 1100, 1107–08 (8th Cir.
2014) (“The next question is whether Hemminghaus was . . . ‘personal staff’ in the FMLA
context. . . . We apply the Teneyuca factors to assist us here.”).
147 654 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1981).  The Tenth Circuit has since abandoned Owens,
relying on Teneyuca instead.  Nichols v. Hurley, 921 F.2d 1101, 1110 (10th Cir. 1990) (per
curiam) (“[W]e believe that the nonexhaustive list of factors to be considered in evaluating
the ‘personal staff’ exception were well articulated in Teneyuca v. Bexar County . . . .”).
148 Teneyuca v. Bexar County, 767 F.2d 148, 151 (5th Cir. 1985).
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the exception is to be narrowly construed.”149  The court also announced an
application principle as well—that many of the factors can be determined by
looking to state law, but state law is only relevant for describing the plaintiff’s
position, duties, method of hiring, supervision, and firing.150
Ultimately, the Teneyuca court did not apply the six-factor test to the
assistant district attorney position, finding that Teneyuca failed to present
any evidence in response to the summary judgment motion.151  The Fifth
Circuit later demonstrated and expounded upon these factors in Montgomery
v. Brookshire.152  In Brookshire, the sheriff of Ector County hired Alton Mont-
gomery as a deputy sheriff to investigate financial crimes.153  Montgomery
was terminated after he issued an arrest warrant for his daughter’s ex-hus-
band—a decision that violated department policy.154  Montgomery subse-
quently filed § 1983 and ADEA claims.155  The district court dismissed the
ADEA claim, noting that Montgomery fell within the ADEA’s “personal staff”
trapdoor.156  The Fifth Circuit, in turn, applied the Teneyuca factors.157  For
the first three factors, they observed that the Texas legislature had deemed
deputies to serve “at the pleasure of the sheriff,”158 and that “[t]he sheriff is
responsible for the official acts of his deputies.”159  Furthermore, the court
wrote that because the public is “generally unaware of the hierarchy” of the
sheriff’s department, “all deputies regardless of position or rank represent
the sheriff in the eyes of the public to some extent.”160  Thus, the first three
factors of Teneyuca were met.
As to the last three factors, the Brookshire court added a gloss of its own.
As to the “amount of control” factor, the Brookshire court narrowed its consid-
eration to “whether customarily the sheriff actually exercise[d] control,” rather
than considering solely if the sheriff held the power to exercise control.161
For the “level in chain of command” factor, the court noted that the exemp-
tion “becomes less applicable the lower the particular employee’s posi-
tion.”162  This observation was guided not by policy, but by the congressional
record, which indicated that “the [personal staff] exception was primarily
149 Id. at 152 (citing Owens, 654 F.2d at 1375).
150 Id. at 150 (citing Calderon v. Martin County, 639 F.2d 271, 273 (5th Cir. Unit B
Mar. 1981)).
151 Id. at 152.
152 34 F.3d 291 (5th Cir. 1994).
153 Id. at 293.
154 Id. at 293–94.
155 Id. at 294.
156 Id.  Recall that the trapdoor is the same in ADEA as in Title VII. See supra note 31
and accompanying text.
157 Brookshire, 34 F.3d at 295–96.
158 Id. at 295 (quoting TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 85.003(c) (West 1988)).
159 Id. at 296 (alteration in original) (quoting Samaniego v. Arguelles, 737 S.W.2d 88,
89 (Tex. App. 1987)).
160 Id. at 296.
161 Id. at 296 n.3.
162 Id. at 296.
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intended to exempt the elected official’s immediate subordinates or those
‘who are his first line advisors.’”163  Thus, the Brookshire court found this fac-
tor to weigh in favor of the plaintiff, since “[the] deputy sheriffs in Ector
County could not possibly be characterized as the Sheriff’s first line advi-
sors.”164  For the final factor, “intimacy,” the court noted the size of the sher-
iff’s department and the amount of contact between the plaintiff and the
elected official.165  The Fifth Circuit then reversed and remanded the case,
saying there was a genuine issue as to whether Montgomery was “personal
staff.”166
The Teneyuca factors have since been adopted by the Sixth Circuit,167
Eighth Circuit,168 and the Tenth Circuit.169  While a number of circuit courts
of appeals have not ruled on the split, several district courts have leaned
toward Teneyuca.170  However, no court has addressed the Fourth Circuit’s
approach with the policy goal of narrowing the trapdoor of “personal staff.”
Part IV addresses the statutory interpretations advocating for a narrower
trapdoor.
IV. SETTLING THE SPLIT: WHY COURTS SHOULD USE CURL-CROMER, AND
HOW CURL-CROMER WILL BETTER NARROW THE TRAPDOOR
A. Understanding How the Curl-Cromer Test Narrows the Trapdoor
Despite the similarities between the two tests, the differences demon-
strate that the Fourth Circuit’s approach (hereafter, the “Curl-Cromer test”) is
more suitable for narrowing the trapdoor.171  In Table 1, the Fifth Circuit’s
Teneyuca test has been placed side-by-side with the Fourth Circuit’s Curl-Cro-
mer test, and the unique factors for each test have been highlighted in bold.
These unique factors demonstrate why the Fifth Circuit’s test inherently cre-
ates a wider exemption, while the Fourth Circuit’s approach produces a nar-
rower exemption.
163 Id. (quoting Owens v. Rush, 654 F.2d 1370, 1375 (10th Cir. 1981)).
164 Id.
165 Id. at 296–97.
166 Id. at 297–98.
167 Birch v. Cuyahoga Cty. Prob. Court, 392 F.3d 151, 158 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Wal-
ton v. Michigan, No. 90-1116, 1990 WL 182033, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 23, 1990) (per
curiam)).
168 Hemminghaus v. Missouri, 756 F.3d 1100, 1107–08 (8th Cir. 2014).
169 Nichols v. Hurley, 921 F.2d 1101, 1110 (10th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
170 See Lockwood v. McMillan, 237 F. Supp. 3d 840, 857 (S.D. Ind. 2017) (“[T]he Sev-
enth Circuit has not determined the meaning of [personal staff]. . . . [C]ourts commonly
apply [Teneyuca] . . . .”); Croci v. Town of Haverstraw, 175 F. Supp. 3d 373, 379–80
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (using Teneyuca in absence of a Second Circuit opinion on the definition
of “personal staff”); Milliones v. Fulton Cty. Gov’t, No. 1:12-CV-3321, 2013 WL 2445206, at
*4 (N.D. Ga. June 5, 2013) (citing Teneyuca); Gupta v. First Judicial Dist., 759 F. Supp. 2d
564, 569 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (using Teneyuca in absence of a Third Circuit framework).
171 For a more concise summation of the differences between the tests, see infra Table
1.
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TABLE 1: COMPARING THE CURL-CROMER AND TENEYUCA FACTORS
Fourth Circuit: Curl-Cromer172 Fifth Circuit: Teneyuca173
(1) whether “promotion of the employ- (1) “whether the elected official has
ee [is] solely up to [the elected official]” plenary powers of appointment and
removal”
(2) whether “the employee occup[ies] a
position high in the chain of command” (2) “whether the person in the position
at issue is personally accountable to only
(3) whether “the employee ha[s] a that elected official”
highly intimate working relationship
with [the elected official]” (3) “whether the person in the position
at issue represents the elected official in
(4) whether “the employee contrib- the eyes of the public”
ute[s] to the making of policy decisions
in [the elected official’s]” (4) “whether the elected official exer-
cises a considerable amount of control
(5) “whether the position in question over the position”
was created pursuant to state law and
compensated pursuant to state law or (5) “the level of the position within the
was the position funded from [the elect- organization’s chain of command”
ed official’s] discretionary budget” 
(6) “the actual intimacy of the working
(6) “what the full [scope] of the individ- relationship between the elected official
ual’s duties were” and the person filling the position”
(7) “whether the individual worked on
[the elected official’s] campaigns”
(8) “whether the employee worked
under the direction of [the elected offi-
cial] or someone else”
Note: Factors that do not appear in both tests have been bolded to highlight the
differences.
Teneyuca creates a larger subset of exempted individuals because it
includes factors that are not in the Fourth Circuit’s test.  The first exclusive
factor presented in Teneyuca is the third factor: “whether the person in the
position at issue represents the elected official in the eyes of the public.”174
This factor proves problematic because courts both inside and outside the
Fifth Circuit have interpreted it to include individuals who are not author-
ized to exercise the power of the office or represent them in official proceed-
172 The first four factors appear in Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1323 (4th Cir. 1996),
and the latter four factors appear in Crain v. Butler, 419 F. Supp. 2d 785, 790 (E.D.N.C.
2005), which cites Cromer, 88 F.3d at 1323.
173 Teneyuca v. Bexar County, 767 F.2d 148, 151 (5th Cir. 1985).
174 Id.
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ings.  For instance, in Hutchison v. Texas County,175 the Western District Court
of Missouri, applying Teneyuca, held that an administrative assistant to the
county prosecuting attorney met the “personal staff” exemption, and thus fell
through the trapdoor and out of Title VII, because having duties “such as
answering phones and attending the office” satisfied whether the individual
represented the elected official in the eyes of the public.176  Similarly, a dis-
trict court in the Second Circuit—a circuit that has not defined “personal
staff”—found that a secretary for a state judge was “personal staff” under
Teneyuca, reasoning that “by answering [the judge’s] phone and attending
his chambers, [the individual] represented [the judge] in the eyes of the
public.”177
This is problematic, as it pushes the outer limit of the exemption farther
than the Fourth Circuit would using Curl-Cromer.  In Curl, the plaintiff, while
serving as a “deputy sheriff,” actually held a similar position to the plaintiffs
in the two cases above; the plaintiff’s work was ministerial, answering phones
and filing paperwork.178  When Cromer followed—holding that a captain with
much more authority in the sheriff’s department was “personal staff,” while
the lieutenant position, which did not have that authority, was not “personal
staff”—a line was drawn in the sand.  The exemption should be narrowed to
apply to only those who represent the official in some official, authoritative
capacity.  After all, as a captain, Mr. Cromer dealt with citizen complaints and
was an outward-facing figure with power to act for the department.179  This
line narrows the trapdoor such that many support staff roles—like techni-
cians and intraoffice personnel—would not be considered “personal staff,”
thus giving them the protections of Title VII.  The Fifth Circuit’s rationale
that any employee represents the official “to some extent” grossly expands
the third factor to consider the fact of employment a factor weighing in favor
of the trapdoor.180
The Fifth Circuit’s other unique factor, “whether the elected official
exercises a considerable amount of control over the position,” widens the
scope of the exemption more broadly than the Fourth Circuit’s test does.
This factor tends to sweep in most categories of employment and does little
to explain how the plaintiff is a member of the elected official’s personal staff.
An elected official would hold control over all of his or her staff, whether
personal or not.  While the Fifth Circuit has tried to limit this factor’s inquiry
to situations where the elected official “actually controls” the plaintiff’s
job,181 that guidance has not sufficiently narrowed the trapdoor.  For
instance, in Hemminghaus v. Missouri,182 the Eighth Circuit was asked to
175 No. 09-3018-CV-S, 2010 WL 11509269 (W.D. Mo. July 23, 2010).
176 Id. at *3–4.
177 Bland v. New York, 263 F. Supp. 2d 526, 531, 536, 540 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
178 Curl v. Reavis, 740 F.2d 1323, 1328 (4th Cir. 1984).
179 Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1324 (4th Cir. 1996).
180 Montgomery v. Brookshire, 34 F.3d 291, 296 (5th Cir. 1994).
181 See id. 296 n.3.
182 756 F.3d 1100 (8th Cir. 2014).
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determine if an elected state judge’s court reporter was considered “personal
staff” for FMLA purposes.183  In applying the Teneyuca factors, the court
applied the “control” factor in duplicative fashion.  It noted that the judge
had “complete authority to hire and fire his official court reporter,” in
essence duplicating the first Teneyuca factor.184  The court also considered
that the judge set the plaintiff’s hours and that her schedule often depended
on the judge’s events.185  However, these are traits of employment that would
be present even outside the “first line advisor” position for which Congress
designed the exemption.186
The Hemminghaus case also illustrates another problem with the Fifth
Circuit’s test.  The Teneyuca factors enlarge the personal staff exemption
beyond its narrow construction by cabining the “highly intimate” principle.
In Teneyuca, the concept of “intimacy” only weighs in as a single factor, rather
than letting it guide the whole analysis.187  This is problematic, as it tends to
enlarge the scope of the exemption by considering traditional employment
tenets (“who has power to fire”; “are they accountable only to the elected
official”) equally with the factor that arguably focuses on Congress’s intent
the most: the “intimacy” factor.
The Fourth Circuit’s test does not have any of these problems.  First, the
overall guiding principle of the Curl-Cromer test, whether the individual
“worked in an intimate and sensitive position of trust,” places a much greater
weight on facts which tend to embody Congress’s goal of encapsulating the
“first line advisors.”188  Whereas the Fifth Circuit considers intimacy as only
one factor on a nonexhaustive list of factors, the Fourth Circuit’s test frames
this inquiry as “the central issue.”189  This added emphasis here shows how
the Fourth Circuit’s test better achieves congressional intent.
Second, the unique factors in the Curl-Cromer test better guide the
court’s analysis toward facts indicative of one being a “first line advisor.”  For
instance, the fourth factor of the Curl-Cromer test, “[d]oes the employee con-
tribute to the making of policy decisions in the [elected official’s] depart-
ment,” is more specific and finely tailored to the authority vested in the
individual’s position.  Unlike the Fifth Circuit’s “representation” factor, the
Fourth Circuit’s analysis weeds out those who “represent” the elected official
solely by nature of their employment with the official.190  Contributing to
183 Id. at 1104, 1107.
184 Id. at 1108.
185 Id. at 1108–09.
186 See Owens v. Rush, 654 F.2d 1370, 1375 (10th Cir. 1981).
187 See Hemminghaus, 756 F.3d at 1109.
188 Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1323 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Curl v. Reavis, 740 F.2d
1323, 1328 (4th Cir. 1984)).
189 Harris v. Anne Arundel County, No. CCB-12-0829, 2014 WL 4924308, at *5 (D. Md.
Oct. 1, 2014), aff’d sub nom. Harris v. Leopold, 600 Fed. App’x 114 (4th Cir. 2015) (per
curiam).
190 See Curl, 740 F.2d at 1328 (finding a sheriff’s deputy was not personal staff where the
deputy “handled the detectives’ telephone calls and correspondence”).
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policy decisions is certainly more in line with the duties of an elected offi-
cial’s “first line advisors,” and not those of technicians and staffers.
Lastly, the seventh factor also produces a smaller set of “personal staff.”
Under the seventh factor, a court should look to “whether the employee
worked in the [elected official’s] political campaign.”191  This factor tends to
narrow the exemption to only those individuals who assisted in the official’s
campaign, likely in some high capacity, such that they would be rewarded
with a position in the official’s office.  For instance, in Harris v. Anne Arundel
County,192 the District Court of Maryland was asked to see if a “community
services person” for the county executive of Anne Arundel County fit the
“personal staff” exemption.193  In using the Curl-Cromer factors, the court
noted that the plaintiff not only met the central principle of being in “an
intimate and sensitive position of trust, close to” the elected official but had
also helped on two prior campaigns, even setting up email accounts and
domains for the elected official at the elected official’s instruction.194  This
example shows how the “campaign” factor creates a smaller definition of
“personal staff,” because it tends to narrow the definition down to those who
both work in the office currently and worked previously on the official’s
campaigns.
The unique factors of the Fifth Circuit test tend to enlarge the trapdoor,
while the Fourth Circuit’s exclusive factors tend to shrink it.  By focusing on
facts that emphasize the intimate relationship with the elected official, rather
than focusing on factors that are common in many employment relation-
ships, the Fourth Circuit’s Curl-Cromer test better narrows the trapdoor of the
“personal staff” exemption.
It is clear that the trapdoor should be narrowed and which circuit test
will have such an effect.  Next, this Note addresses the legal arguments for
preferring Curl-Cromer over Teneyuca.  In short, Curl-Cromer is the better inter-
pretation of the “personal staff” exemption not only because of the real-
world advantages addressed above, but also because it is more in line with
congressional intent, the purposes of federal discrimination statutes, and
agency interpretations of the provision.
B. Basis for Selecting the Curl-Cromer Test
1. Congressional Intent
First and foremost, the narrower Curl-Cromer test is appropriate because
Congress intended the exemption to be narrow.  This is most clearly seen in
the drafting history of GERA.  When first enacted, Title VII did not contain
any exemptions to the definition of “employee.”195  “[E]mployee” was
191 Cromer, 88 F.3d at 1323.
192 Harris, 2014 WL 4924308.
193 Id. at *1–3.
194 Id. at *4–5.
195 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701(f), 78 Stat. 241, 255.
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defined as “an individual employed by an employer.”196  Instead, a broader
exemption was found in the definition of “employer,” which exempted
“State[s] [and] political subdivision[s] thereof.”197  In other words, “personal
staff” were not protected not because of an “employee” exemption, but
because Title VII broadly exempted all state governments from the definition
of “employer.”  The trapdoor as we know it today was added during the 1972
amendments to Title VII.198
Amendment efforts first began in 1971, when Representative Augustus F.
Hawkins introduced the Equal Employment Opportunities Enforcement Act
(House Bill 1746 or the “Hawkins bill”).199  Representative Hawkins had two
aims: increase the enforcement power of the EEOC and expand its jurisdic-
tion to include state and local employees.200  These goals ran headfirst into
federalism concerns, the defenders of which objected to expanding the
EEOC’s jurisdiction to state and local governments.  Opponents of the Haw-
kins bill instead preferred a substitute bill provided by Representative John
N. Erlenborn (House Bill 9247,201 which later took the label of House Bill
1746,202 also known as the “Erlenborn bill”), “which lacked provisions to
enlarge the jurisdiction of the EEOC.”203  Representative Mazzoli, a sup-
porter of the Erlenborn bill, echoed these federalism concerns: “[The
Erlenborn bill] does not change the present EEOC operations with respect
to courage of State and local government employees. . . . [T]here is an inter-
position under the [Hawkins] bill which I think is disastrous, that is, the
interposition of the Federal Government into State and local matters.”204
The Erlenborn bill did not contain any amendments to the definition of
“employee” or “employer.”205  Thus, it would not tamper with the broad state
government exemption in the definition of “employer.”
These federalism concerns ultimately won out, with the Erlenborn bill
defeating the Hawkins bill by six votes.206  Thus, under the House’s bill, the
196 Id.
197 Id. § 701(b)(1).
198 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103,
103; see Alaska v. EEOC, 564 F.3d 1062, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009) (Ikuta, J., dissenting) (briefly
explaining the amendment).
199 Equal Employment Opportunities Enforcement Act of 1971, H.R. 1746, 92d Cong.;
Richard R. Rivers, In America, What You Do Is What You Are: The Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972, 22 CATH. U. L. REV. 455, 460 (1973) (illustrating the first efforts in the House).
200 Rivers, supra note 199, at 460.
201 H.R. 9247, 92d Cong. (1971).
202 Katherine J. Thomson, The Disparate Impact Theory: Congressional Intent in 1972—A
Response to Gold, 8 INDUS. REL. L.J. 105, 106–07 (1986) (“The House eventually agreed to
substitute the text of [H.R. 9247] for that of H.R. 1746.  The House passed H.R. 1746, with
the substituted text of H.R. 9247 . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
203 Rivers, supra note 199, at 461.
204 92 CONG. REC. 31,971 (1971).
205 H.R. 1746, 92d Cong. (1971), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE S. COMM. ON
LABOR & PUB. WELFARE, 92D CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, at 498 (Comm. Print 1972) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
206 Rivers, supra note 199, at 461.
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exemption would stay broad.  However, thanks to the pressure of Father The-
odore Hesburgh, Chairman of the United States Commission on Civil
Rights,207 the Senate did not adopt the Erlenborn bill.208  Instead, the Sen-
ate adopted a bill identical to the Hawkins bill, thereby expanding Title VII
to cover all government employees.209  This set the stage for a showdown.210
A conference committee was formed to work out the differences between the
House bill (the Erlenborn bill) and the Senate bill (essentially, the Hawkins
bill).211
It is here that we see Congress’s intent behind the trapdoor.212  At the
conference, the Senate conferees originally proposed expanding Title VII to
include “State and local governments, governmental agencies, [and] political
subdivisions (except for elected officials, their personal assistants and immediate
advisors).”213  This language did not survive the conference.  In a joint
explanatory statement of the managers on the conference committee, the
conferees reported that
[i]t is the intention of the conferees to exempt elected officials and members
of their personal staffs, and persons appointed by such elected officials as advi-
sors or to policymaking positions at the highest levels of the departments or
agencies of State or local governments, such as cabinet officers, and persons
with comparable responsibilities at the local level,214
but that the exemption “shall be construed narrowly.”215
In light of the disagreement between the two houses and the express
command to apply the exemption narrowly, it is clear that the trapdoor in
§ 2000e(f) was not meant to encapsulate a wide swath of employees.  Since
Curl-Cromer produces a narrower group of exempt employees, it is thus more
in line with Congress’s intent.
2. Legislative Purpose
Curl-Cromer is also more appropriate than Teneyuca because it better
aligns with Title VII’s noble purpose of ending employment discrimination.
“In passing Title VII, Congress made the simple but momentous announce-
207 And, at the time, noted president of this Law Review’s University. See generally
MICHAEL O’BRIEN, HESBURGH: A BIOGRAPHY (1998).
208 Rivers, supra note 199, at 461–62.  Given the scarce focus on the employee exemp-
tions in the congressional record, it is unlikely that this language in particular was the
impetus of Father Hesburgh’s advocacy.
209 S. 2515, 92d Cong. (1971), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 205, at 344.
210 See Rivers, supra note 199, at 462.
211 See id.
212 See Rivers, supra note 199, at 460; Kristin Sommers Czubkowski, Comment, Equal
Opportunity: Federal Employees’ Right to Sue on Title VII and Tort Claims, 80 U. CHI. L. REV.
1841, 1845 (2013) (describing the effect of the Act).
213 H.R. REP. NO. 92-238 (1972) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137,
2180 (emphasis added).
214 Id. (emphasis added).
215 Id. (emphasis added).
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ment that sex, race, religion, and national origin are not relevant to the selec-
tion, evaluation, or compensation of employees.”216  Its proscriptions
“evince[ ] a congressional intent ‘to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women’ in employment,”217 and “entrench a merit-
based workplace where specified traits or status-based criteria (race, color,
national origin, religion, and sex) are supposed to be irrelevant to a person’s
job opportunities.”218  Even the 1972 amendments, which created the trap-
door, were supposed to “bring an end to job discrimination once and for
all.”219
Since 1964, the Supreme Court has expanded Title VII to better effectu-
ate this purpose.  Racial discrimination,220 sexual discrimination,221 and
religious discrimination222 under Title VII all have been enlarged to provide
greater protections.  Procedural steps have also been relaxed to better
accommodate plaintiffs.223  And while these protections have grown, the
exceptions and exemptions, in turn, have shrunk.  One of Title VII’s notable
exceptions, the bona fide occupational qualification exception—which
allows discrimination based on sex, religion, and national origin where “rea-
sonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise”224—has been described by the Supreme Court as “extremely nar-
row.”225  The religious organizations exemption has also been deemed lim-
ited in scope.226  In sum, Curl-Cromer is the better interpretation because it is
more in line with this Title VII jurisprudence—it increases protections by
216 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989) (plurality opinion).
217 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (emphasis added) (quot-
ing L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
218 William N. Eskridge Jr., Title VII’s Statutory History and the Sex Discrimination Argument
for LGBT Workplace Protections, 127 YALE L.J. 322, 322 (2017).
219 Alaska v. EEOC, 564 F.3d 1062, 1078 (9th Cir. 2009) (O’Scannlain, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (quoting H.R. REP NO. 92-238, at 2141 (1972) (Conf. Rep.)).
220 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 n.1 (1998) (noting that racial
harassment cases are actionable); Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 556 F.3d 502, 512 (6th Cir.
2009) (noting the judicial creation of associational racial discrimination).
221 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998) (unanimous
holding) (expanding sex discrimination to include same-sex sexual harassment); Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (eliminating concrete psychological harm
requirements); Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 256–57 (creating “sex stereotyping” as a form
of discrimination); Meritor, 477 U.S. at 73 (establishing sexual harassment as actionable).
222 See EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2032 (2015) (holding
that there is no “knowledge” requirement in a failure to accommodate claim).
223 See Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 522 U.S. 389, 402 (2008) (easing the require-
ments for an EEOC charge); Calloway v. Partners Nat’l Health Plans, 986 F.2d 446, 450
(11th Cir. 1993) (expanding the single filing rule).
224 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(e) (2012).
225 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977); accord Int’l Union, UAW v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991).
226 Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723, 735 (9th Cir. 2011) (O’Scannlain, J.,
concurring).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-1\NDL111.txt unknown Seq: 30 26-NOV-19 8:44
442 notre dame law review [vol. 95:1
offering better forums and remedies and is narrow like Title VII’s other
exceptions and exemptions.
3. Agency Interpretations
Finally, Curl-Cromer is most appropriate because it is more in line with
administrative interpretations of the “personal staff” exemption.  The specific
weight of these interpretations will depend on a deference inquiry which
need not be addressed here.227  For present purposes, it suffices to say that
these interpretations will be afforded some weight in determining the mean-
ing of “personal staff.”228
Only two agencies have interpreted the “personal staff” exemption.  The
EEOC has offered guidance in its Compliance Manual,229 and the U.S.
Department of Labor has interpreted the FLSA’s “personal staff” exemp-
tion,230 which is identical to the Title VII provision.231  Both interpretations
favor the Curl-Cromer test.  First, the EEOC’s Compliance Manual approves of
Cromer by name.232  The Commission also includes an example of how to
apply the “personal staff” exemption:
CP, a deputy sheriff, performed primarily clerical and secretarial duties,
including serving subpoenas, typing complaints and reports, handling detec-
tives[’] telephone calls and correspondence, and assigning case files. The
position was created and compensation was provided pursuant to state law.  CP did
not occupy a high place in the chain of command.  She was not under the
sheriff[’]s personal direction, and promotion requests were brought to the
sheriff’s subordinate.  There was no evidence that CP had a highly confiden-
tial and sensitive relationship with the sheriff.  Under these circumstances,
CP was not a member of the sheriff[’]s personal staff.233
Note, here, the emphasized text. First, a Curl-Cromer-exclusive factor is
present.  Only the Curl-Cromer test considers whether the position in question
was created by and compensated under state law.234  Second, this hypotheti-
cal also uses the language of Curl-Cromer, and not of Teneyuca.  For example,
when considering the staffer’s role relative to the official’s role, the Curl-Cro-
mer test considers whether “promotion of the employee [is] solely up to the
[elected official]” and “whether the employee worked under the direction of
227 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (recapping when to
afford deference to an agency’s statutory interpretation); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
134, 140 (1944).
228 Courts have relied on these interpretations without using a deference analysis. See,
e.g., Bland v. New York, 263 F. Supp. 2d 526, 538 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
229 See EEOC Compliance Manual, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://
www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/threshold.html (last updated Aug. 6, 2009).
230 See 29 C.F.R. § 553.11(b) (2018).
231 Bland, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 538.
232 EEOC Compliance Manual, supra note 229, at n.86 (citing Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d
1315, 1323–24 (4th Cir. 1996)).
233 Id. § 2-III(A)(5)(d) (emphasis added).
234 Cromer, 88 F.3d at 1323.
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the [elected] official.”235  While the Teneyuca factors touch on similar
themes, they do not use these words, electing instead to ask if the employee is
“personally accountable” only to the official or if the official has “plenary
powers of appointment and removal.”236  Yet, look at the words used by the
EEOC in its hypothetical: the EEOC noted that the hypothetical plaintiff “was
not under the sheriff[’]s personal direction,” and that her “promotion requests
were brought to the sheriff’s subordinate.”237  Mirroring the specific lan-
guage from Curl-Cromer gives the Fourth Circuit’s test another tally.  In these
two ways, the EEOC’s interpretation leans in favor of Curl-Cromer.
The Department of Labor’s interpretation also favors Curl-Cromer,
because the Department’s regulations support a narrow definition of “per-
sonal staff.”  The relevant regulations here explain that “[t]he statutory term
‘member of personal staff’ generally includes only persons who are under the
direct supervision of the selecting elected official and have regular contact
with such official.”238  This echoes the “highly intimate” principle that is key
in Curl-Cromer.  The regulations further draw a narrow scope by saying “[t]he
term typically does not include individuals who are directly supervised by
someone other than the elected official even though they may have been
selected by the official.  For example, the term might include the elected
official’s personal secretary, but would not include the secretary to an assis-
tant.”239  The regulations also set mandatory and strict requirements, writing
that “such personal staff members must be appointed by, and serve solely at
the pleasure or discretion of, the elected official.”240  These rules indicate a
smaller exemption scope, as they are littered with qualifications that must be
met.  While this language is similar to Teneyuca, the regulations here actually
advocate for an even stricter standard than in Teneyuca due to the Depart-
ment’s use of the word “must.”241  Thus, the Department of Labor’s regula-
tions advocate for whichever test will produce a smaller set of exempt
employees.  As shown above, that would be Curl-Cromer.
CONCLUSION
Kimberly Edelstein, a Butler County staff attorney claiming religious dis-
crimination, fell through the “personal staff” trapdoor.242  Her case is
emblematic for why clarity in the trapdoor is needed: the EEOC classified her
235 Id. (emphasis added).  For an illustration of the exclusive factors in each test, see
supra Table 1.
236 Teneyuca v. Bexar County, 767 F.2d 148, 151 (5th Cir. 1985).
237 EEOC Compliance Manual, supra note 229, § 2-III(A)(5)(d) (emphasis added).
These words are italicized in the above block quote.
238 29 C.F.R. § 553.11(b) (2018) (emphasis added).
239 Id.
240 § 553.11(c) (emphasis added).
241 Id.
242 See Edelstein v. Stephens, No. 1:17-cv-305, 2018 WL 948769, at *1–2, 19 (S.D. Ohio
Feb. 16, 2018), adopted in part and rejected in part by No. 1:17-cv-305, 2018 WL 1558868, at *7
(S.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2018).
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charge as a Title VII religious discrimination charge rather than as a GERA
charge.243  Because of this label, Ms. Edelstein did not proceed into GERA’s
administrative framework, and instead, she mistakenly was given a right- to-
sue letter, which led to her filing her GERA claim in district court.244  The
court dismissed her GERA claim, noting that Ms. Edelstein’s only remedy
under GERA was the EEOC administrative framework.245  Thus, months
after filing her initial charge, she was back at square one all because of a
misunderstanding during her intake.
This error causes more than just lost time.  Plaintiffs who fall into GERA
lose the chance to argue in federal district court before an Article III judge
using the Federal Rules of Evidence.  They lose the ability to argue publicly
to a judge or jury, thereby losing the chance to increase awareness and gener-
ate power through publicity.  They lose the chance to seek punitive damages
even in the most heinous of cases.  A broad definition of “personal staff”
forecloses the potential of a Commissioner Charge, which would be espe-
cially helpful in the world of state politics where victims fear the “political
consequences for speaking out.”246  A broad definition also creates a dichot-
omy of protection between congressional aides who receive trial court rights
and GERA plaintiffs who do not.
To better protect these individuals, courts should adopt the Fourth Cir-
cuit’s Curl-Cromer framework.  The Fourth Circuit’s test narrows the defini-
tion of “personal staff” by putting a larger emphasis on the intimacy between
the plaintiff and the elected official rather than on common characteristics
found in many employment relationships.  By focusing its analysis on those
vested with authority and who act as “first line advisors,” the Fourth Circuit’s
test shrinks the scope of the exemption, thus allowing more state employees
to utilize Title VII.  Furthermore, there is ample legal justification for siding
with Curl-Cromer.  Congress’s guidance that the “personal staff” exemption be
“narrowly construed” shows that Congress intended the trapdoor to be nar-
row.  Congress’s purpose in passing Title VII and related statutes will only be
furthered by narrowing the trapdoor.  A narrower trapdoor is also most con-
sistent with agency interpretation of the “personal staff” language.
In light of the #MeToo movement, a narrower trapdoor can only be seen
as a benefit.  By having a narrower exemption, we increase accountability
while promoting sexual equality.  This will extend an invitation to state-
employed workers: now you too are free to say, “Time’s up!”
243 Edelstein, 2018 WL 948769, at *2.
244 Id. at *2–4; Complaint at 7–9, Edelstein, No. 1:17-cv-305, 2018 WL 948769.
245 Edelstein, 2018 WL 948769, at *4.
246 Wallace, supra note 69.
